National saving rates di¤er enormously across developed countries. But these differences obscure a common trend, namely a dramatic decline over time. international and intertemporal di¤erences? Is it demographics, government spending, productivity growth or preferences? Our answer is preferences. Developed societies are placing increasing weight on the welfare of those currently alive, particularly contemporaneous older generations. This conclusion emerges from estimating two models in which society makes consumption and labor supply decisions in light of uncertainty over future government spending, productivity, and social preferences. The two models di¤er in terms of the nature of preference uncertainty and the extent to which current society can control future societies'spending and labor supply decisions.
Introduction
National saving rates di¤er enormously across developed countries. But these di¤erences mask a common trend, namely a dramatic decline over time. Table 1 What explains these di¤erences across countries and over time? Is it changes in demographics, preferences, government spending or economic conditions? To address this question, we estimate a model in which the government and household sector jointly make labor supply and consumption decisions. This societal decision-making framework is motivated by Green and Kotliko¤'s (2006) demonstration that economic models with rational agents draw no distinction between private and public property. Instead, the government and household sectors e¤ectively play the role of two people stranded on an island, each of whom can claim, via "o¢ cial," "legal," or informal proclamation, to own all or part of the island's resources, including his own and the other party's time. But such claims have no economic basis or import. What each person ends up consuming in goods and leisure depends on fundamental factors, including the ability to threaten and cajole.
Our one-good, closed-economy model assumes that the government and the public (society) resolve their con ‡icts and capitalize on their opportunities by agreeing to maximize a social welfare function. This function equals the expected discounted ‡ow of utility from the public's future consumption and leisure. Each period's consumption and leisure decisions are made in light of uncertain future levels of productivity and government spending as well as uncertain future social preferences.
We model social preference-uncertainty in two ways. In model 1, current society is in charge forever. It knows its current intertemporal preferences (rate of time preference) and current intratemporal preferences (relative weighting of di¤erent age groups'utilities from consumption and leisure). What it doesn't know is its future intertemporal preferences (how its rate of time preference will evolve). Model 2 is a time-inconsistency variant of model 1.
Rather than posit a single society that is in charge forever, we permit the society in charge to change each period. Although each society knows for sure its future preferences, each society realizes that it can control future social consumption and leisure allocation decisions only indirectly via the amount of capital it leaves behind.
We use the method of moments to estimate the two models for the U.S., France, and Italy.
All six sets of results point to the same culprit for the declines in national rates of saving, namely changing social preferences that place ever greater weight on current generations relative to future generations.
Model 1: Uncertain Future Preferences
The economy's single good is produced via
e a P a;t n a;t
where is capital share in production, A t = (1+ )A t 1 captures labor-augmenting technical progress, occurring at rate ; Z t is time-t multifactor productivity, e a is the earning ability (e¢ ciency units) of an individual age a, and P a;t counts the population age a at time t. Each individual has one unit of time available each period.
The economy's capital stock, K, evolves according to
where d is the depreciation rate, c a;t and n a;t are the consumption and labor supply of age-a agents at time t, and g t is the level of government spending scaled by the level of labor- 
Multifactor productivity, Z t , and scale government spending, g t , deviate around stationary long-term values according to the following
Society cares about the utility from consumption and leisure of those agents now alive and those yet to be born. At any point in time, the weight applied to contemporaneous agents' utilities in the social welfare function depends on their ages. Current consumption and labor supply decisions are made in light of uncertainty about future productivity, government spending and rates of time preference.
Society's expected utility at time t is
where the a parameters are the aforementioned utility weights, the function u(:; :) is assumed to be of addilog form:
1 For further details see Fehr et al. (2007) . 2 For further details see Maliar and Maliar (2001) . We measure labor supply as the share of each year spent working. and s is the time-s discount factor. Society knows t , but is uncertain about future values of s for s > t. Because today's society controls all future allocations, the issue here is one of uncertain future desires, not changing decision makers; i.e., the problem here involves preference uncertainty, not time inconsistency. The discount factor obeys ln t = (1 ) ln + ln t 1 + t with t N (0;
As with Z t and g t , the t follows an autoregressive progress that ‡uctuates around a longrun stationary value, and its lagged value represents another state variable. Finally, utility weights are modeled via a third-order polynomial, i.e.,
Society's solves the following program:
V t (Z t ; g t; t ; K t ) = max Ca;t;na;t ( 100 X a=0 a P a;t u(c a;t ; n a;t )
subject to (2) . Optimality requires
(1 n a;t ) = e a w t b c a;t ;
where r t and w t are time-t marginal products of capital and labor.
We solve this and the other model via backward induction taking 2100 as the terminal year. Using a later terminus makes little di¤erence to parameter estimates. Expectations are calculated using Gaussian quadrature. and will value future consumption and leisure allocations. But it doesn't directly control future allocations. Instead, each period's allocations are made by the prevailing society (the decision makers in charge in the period at hand) based on time-preference rates that will generally di¤er from those of current society. The precise levels of such future time-preference factors are unknown to current society. But current society knows that these preference factors will evolve according to (8) . It also knows that its sole manner of in ‡uencing future allocations is via the amount of capital it transmits to the next society, which, in turn, in ‡uences what the next society will leave to the following society, and so on.
Formally, each society selects an allocation strategy taking the strategies of other societies as given. This strategy is a map from the state r t = ft; Z t ; g t ; t ; K t g to the choice variables fc a;t ; n a;t g for a 2 [0; ::; 100]. The …xed point in the strategy space, which guarantees that all strategies are optimal given the strategies of the other players, is a Nash equilibrium.
Time-t society chooses fc a;t ; n a;t g for all a 2 [0; ::; 100] to maximize
P a;t a U (c a;t ; n a;t ) + (14)
P a;t+ a U c a;t+ (r t+ ); n a;t+ (r t+ ) ! ; subject to (2) and conditional on its state variables r t . Note that c a;t+ (r t+ ) and n a;t+ (r t+ ) denote the optimal choice that the time-(t + ) future society will make contingent on the prevailing state variables r t+ .
We also solve this problem recursively, starting at date T . First we work out the society T s allocation decisions as functions of the state variables in the last period, r T . Next, we determine society (T 1)'s allocation decisions as functions of r T 1 . In making its decisions, the (T 1) society considers not only its welfare from period (T 1) allocations, which it directly controls, but also the expected value of its future welfare (discounted using its own time-preference rate) from period T decisions made by society T . The (T 2)
society has a similar problem to that of the (T 1) society except that it must consider how two future societies will allocate consumption and leisure and so on.
We use Monte Carlo simulations to determine how a society prevailing at time s makes its decisions. Speci…cally, for given state variables at time s; r s , and each candidate times allocation (consumption and leisure choices), we form the average of current and future realized utility outcomes generated by the simulations to determine how much expected utility the candidate allocation generates. The allocation with the highest expected utility constitutes the optimal time-s decision. The Monte Carlo simulations entail taking draws of future paths of time-preference rates, productivity levels, and levels of scaled government consumption and using the previously determined allocation decisions of future societies to determine the consumption and leisure values that will be chosen along any path. As with model 1, we assess a shift in social time preference in terms of the degree to which the long-run value of lies below its initial value as well as the speed at which societal time preference converges, on average, to its long-run value. We employed a fourth-order polynomial in interpolating from our 1950-2050 data to form single-age population counts from 2051 through 2100. 3 
Estimation
To limit the number of parameters to be estimated, we assume a 5 percent annual rate of depreciation. We normalize the 1950 values of Z and, following an example discussed by Zhao, Dutkowsky, and Dunsky (1999), we set b at 1. Our 1950 value of K comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis' series on …xed reproducible tangible wealth. 4 Rather than jointly estimate the persistence coe¢ cient g and standard deviation t for government expenditure in (5) together with other model parameters, we obtain estimates of these parameters from a VAR(1) of total government expenditure adjusted for labour-augmenting technical progress. 5 The U.S. data for our VAR(1)s come from U.S. National Income and Product Accounts. 6 The date for France and Italy come from the Penn World Tables.   7   3 Given the data points, the aim of polynomial interpolation is to …nd the polynomial that …ts exactly through these points. In practice, we generated the fourth order polynomial in time for the 1950-2050 period. We further used the estimated polynomial coe¢ cients to obtain the single-age projected counts of population. 4 The net foreign asset position was obtained by substracting the foreign investments in the country from the investments abroad. For the U.S., data was obtained from Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/international/xls/intinv05_t2.xls and BEA archive records), while for France and Italy, since no data were available, we interpolated within the grid for capital in order to obtain the U.S. correspondent initial capital point for these countries. 5 We obtained adjusted government expenditure by simply dividing the total amount of government spending at time t by (1 + ) t . 6 http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb, Tables 3.9.3 and 3.9.6. 7 http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/.
We use the Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) 8 , to estimate the parameters 0 = ; ; 0 ; ; ; t ; ; Z ; "t ; ; 0 ; 1 ; 2 ; 3 :
We estimate the parameters of the discount-factor process conditional on ten di¤erent assumed initial (1950) values of and choose the one that generates the data for which SMM results best …t their empirical counterparts. We choose this method of estimating the initial value of for the following reason. As indicated, the current value of is a continuous state variable. But in running our dynamic program, we limit our grid for to ten possible values ranging from 1 to 10 possible values. Were we instead to attempt to estimate for 1950 along with other parameters in 0 , we would surely compute a value di¤erent from that on our grid, i.e., treating as a continuous, rather than discrete, unknown parameter would be inconsistent with the assumptions underlying the dynamic program used to calculate . Table 3 lists our choice of moments.
In implementing SMM, we simulate N = 20 paths of the economy and collect for each path the simulated values of each variable. 9 We compute the set of moments conditional on the initial values of the state variables r 0 and on the parameters 0 and minimize J T -the weighted sum of squared deviations of simulated moments from their empirical counterparts:
where m T represents data moments and m N (r 0 ; 0 ) is the set of moments of each of the N simulated paths of the arti…cial economy. W is the weighting or distance matrix that almost surely converges to W = S 1 , where S is the limit, as N T ! 1, of the constant full-rank matrix of the covariance of the estimation errors. . 9 Using more paths than 20 to compute moments didn't change results materially. 10 As described in Andrews (1991) , an optimal weighting matrix is obtained as the inverse of the variancecovariance matrix of the moment conditions evaluated at a set of …rst-step estimates, in which W is set equal to the identity matrix. This matrix is consistently estimated using the estimator proposed by Newey For a given number N of path, as T ! 1, if the weighting matrix W is chosen optimally,
where j is the number of moments and k is the number of estimated parameters. and West (1994), which places more weight on moments that are more precisely estimated. Implementing this method entails …tting the moments of the simulated series to their real data counterparts under the condition of W = I and then using estimates from this stage to form the weighting matrix W = S 1 for use in a second and …nal stage estimation of (15). ity of substitution ) are 5.79, 4.91, and 5.75; the estimates of (the rate of labor-augmenting technical change) are close to 2 percent for all three countries; the respective estimates of (capital's share) are 0.29, 0.31, and 0.31; the respective estimates of Z (the autoregressive coe¢ cient for multifactor productivity) are 1.25, 1.23, and 1.18.
Findings

11
Figures 1 and 2 plot model 1's and 2's respective age-speci…c utility weights for each country. As expected, the weights rise with age through middle age for all countries and for both models. For the U.S. and Italy, the pro…les then head south (apart from an increase at very old ages in Italy's model 2). For France, the weights continue to rise with age in model 1; in model 2, the weights peak and then start to rise again around age 85. These larger utility weights at older ages may re ‡ect social preferences toward providing the elderly with expensive age-related health care services. Or they may simply re ‡ect the inability of our estimating procedure to closely pin down the value of the cubic coe¢ cient in the polynomial used to capture the age-weight relationship. Another point of interest are the shapes of the age-weight pro…les for the three countries. They suggest that French and Italian societies place relatively more weight on the well being of the elderly than does American society.
Tables 7 -9 address our main question: Has social time-discounting or age-weighting changed over time in each country in ways that help explain observed declines in the three countries'national saving rates? The answer is yes, with time-discounting playing the key role. As these tables indicate, the initial discount fact, 0 , exceeds its long-run value, , for each country. Hence, over time, each country places less and less weight on the well being of those coming in the future. 12 The di¤erences between 0 and may seem small, but they can be substantial when translated into time preference rates. For U.S., the long-run 11 Note that a value above 1 is to be expected given that we are have not detrended the data. 12 Note that the values of 0 and both exceed 1. Given that the model we are estimating has a …nite horizon (year 2100), this presents no problem with respect to an explosive value of the expected utility maximand. Furthermore, given secular growth in consumption, we would expect a discount factor above 1. As discussed in Jonsson and Klein (1996) and Cooley and Prescott (1995) , a discount factor in excess of 1 can be consistent with long-run secular growth and in…nite horizon utility. One simply needs to normalize the model for labor-augmenting technical change and note that the normalized discount factor is less than 1; i.e., that the normalized model has a …nite maximand. Instead of adopting this approach, we preferred to estimate the labor-augmenting technical change rate as a parameter. time preference rate is 36.1 percent higher than its initial (1950) value for both models. For France, the long-run increase in time preference rates is 9.2 percent in the case of model 1 and 9.0 percent in the case of model 2. For Italy, there's a 54.0 percent rise in the time preference rate based on model 1 and a 8.2 percent increase based on model 2.
This shift toward present-orientation in ‡uences national saving. Tables 10 -12 show actual and simulated saving rates for each country under models 1 and 2. The rows labeled "baseline" refer to the saving rates generated by the two models. The f ixed row shows how each country's saving rate would have evolved had the discount factor remained at its 1950 level. In both the baseline and …xed-simulations, we start in 1950 and run our models forward setting all error terms to zero. In the U.S., the simulated national saving rates are very similar for both models and accord fairly well with actual rates for 1970, 1990, and 2000. For 1980, the simulated saving rates under each model are much lower than the observed rate. Given that we are assuming no shocks to the economy in the simulations, we wouldn't expect a close relationship between actual and simulated rates in all years. In the case of France, the two models' baseline simulated saving rates are also in fairly close agreement, although they do less well than in the case of the U.S. in predicting observed saving rates. For Italy, the two baselines saving rate paths di¤er considerably with neither matching observed saving rates very closely.
According to both models, saving rates would have been either substantially or dramatically higher had American, French, and Italian societies not become so focused on immediate grati…cation. The U.S. saving rate is more than twice as large in 2000 with a …xed than it is with a declining , which is the baseline case. Under model 2, the year-2000 …xed-saving rate is almost 50 percent larger than the declining-rate. For France, model 1's …xed-simulation produces a year-2000 rate of saving that's almost 80 percent higher than the baseline value. This di¤erential …gure is just over 60 percent higher in model 2. For Italy, model 1 generates a year-2000 saving rate that's more than one third higher when stays …xed; model 2 generates a year-2000 rate that's over three times as large! One response to these …ndings is that estimating a declining was virtually guaranteed given that we're …tting declining national saving rates and that a declining value of can easily track this. Our response is that we aren't …tting the saving rates per se. Instead, we're …tting the second moments listed in Table 3 . In addition, there are other factors in the model that might have explained the decline in national saving rates, producing estimates of above those for 0 . These include the countries' changing demographics, trends in government spending, trends in multifactor productivity growth and the interactions of these trends with the levels of the utility-function parameters and other model parameters.
Conclusions
National saving rates have been declining dramatically in developed countries in recent decades. This paper estimates two models for the U.S., France, and Italy, with both models featuring uncertain future rates of social time-preference. In one model, current social decision makers remain in charge over time. The second model incorporates timeinconsistency under which current social decision makers can only indirectly in ‡uence future social decision makers via the amount of capital they leave for their successors.
Parameter estimates from both models show that shifts in societal preferences, which have placed ever greater weight on immediate grati…cation, are the principal reason that the U.S., France, and Italy are saving at much lower rates now than they did in the past. Of course, most future consumption and leisure will be done by future generations. Hence, our results are, in part, indicative of growing intergenerational sel…shness. Table 7 Parameter Estimates, U.S. 
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